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WHY BIGGER IS NOT ALWAYS BETTER: DODD-FRANK & ITS
IMPACT ON SMALL BANKS & BUSINESSES

SARAH KING*
“As battle-scarred survivors of a financial crisis and deep
recession, community bankers today confront a frustratingly slow
recovery, stiff competition from larger banks and other financial
institutions, and the responsibility of complying with new and
existing regulations. Some observers have worried that these
obstacles‑‑particularly complying with regulations‑‑may prove
insurmountable.”1
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that the year is 2006. Along with partners and
investors, you have just taken one of the biggest risks of your life
and founded a small business. Specifically, your business acts as
a broker of financial instruments known as energy derivatives; it
matches buyers and sellers of futures, options, and other
derivatives, and a portion of the money made from the trade is
collected as a fee for your services. For the most part, the business
runs smoothly. You’re rarely stressed, your customers are
satisfied with your services, and you and your co-workers make
good money.
Imagine that the year is 2008. A financial crisis devastates the
world economic markets and puts Wall Street in a tailspin.
Excessive risk-taking by large banks and the collapse of the U.S.
housing market are largely to blame, but you are far removed from
the core of the economic meltdown. In fact, small businesses like
yours pose barely any risk to the financial system when compared
to the institutions that caused the 2008 collapse. Your business


*

J.D. Candidate, St. John’s University School of Law, May 2022.

1 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,

Remarks at “Community Banking in the 21st Century,” a Conference Co-sponsored by the
Federal Reserve System and the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, St. Louis, Missouri
(Oct. 2, 2013), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20131002a.
html.
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emerges from the recession relatively unscathed, but other
institutions are not so lucky.2
Now imagine that the year is 2010. Your business is finally
turning a profit and things are looking up. Then comes DoddFrank. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act3 introduces a regulatory framework to prevent the
Great Recession of 2008 from happening again in the future. In
practice, however, Dodd-Frank causes more harm than good for
you, even threatening your collapse.
The most detrimental impact of Dodd-Frank is its high
compliance costs. You must now comply with a slew of regulatory
requirements that take precious time and money away from
serving your clients. The Act adversely affects your business in
ways that Congress did not imagine. Dodd-Frank does not
discriminate when it comes to the financial instruments it
regulates—therein lies the problem for your small business. DoddFrank regards your business and the derivatives it handles as
posing the same large risks as other types of businesses, even
though the actual risks posed by your business and theirs vary
dramatically.4
You think to yourself, why am I being regulated for something I
had nothing to do with? Eventually, the incredible workload you
take on to comply with Dodd-Frank becomes too much. You are
forced to shut down your business in 2014, abandoning everything
you worked so hard to accomplish over the past few years.
This scenario, based on the true story of Brad Schaeffer,
provides one example of how Dodd-Frank overwhelmed the
entities it strove to regulate.5 There are many others.6 Chris Dodd,


2 E.g., Ian Mount, And 7 Businesses That Did Not Survive, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/31/business/smallbusiness/31deaths.html.
3 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §5301 et seq.).
4 See Brad Schaeffer, The Dodd-Frank Effect: ‘Too Small to Succeed,’ WALL ST. J. (Apr.
9, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/news/archive/years (click on “April” in the “2014” column,
then click on “April 9,” then go to page 2 and scroll down to the article) (“[T]the law considers
a utility looking to hedge its long-term exposure to fluctuating gas prices, and the brokers
who facilitate such deals, to be as much a threat to global order as cowboy credit-defaultswap speculators stacking up insane leverage.”).
5 See id.; Restoring Credit to Main Street: Proposals to Fix Small Business Borrowing
And Lending Problems, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Economic Policy, 111th Cong. 2
(2008) (Statement of Sen. Jeff Merkley) (discussing an Oregon company that suffered due
to banks cutting their credit lines post-Dodd-Frank).
6 See, e.g., James Murphy, What the Administration’s Stance on Dodd-Frank Means for
Small Business Lending, FORBES (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/?sh=5e216d7
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namesake of the Dodd-Frank Act and chief engineer of the bill,
even admitted in 2010 that “[n]o one will know until [the DoddFrank Act] is actually in place how it works.”7 In the ten years
since its passage, Dodd-Frank’s impact has been much more wideranging than lawmakers anticipated.8 The regulations imposed on
banks and securities, futures, and derivatives markets have
proven to be immensely burdensome.9 More specifically, small
banks have had to revise their practices and reduce their lending
to comply with Dodd-Frank, and small businesses have suffered
as a result.10
In May of 2018, Congress took an important step to address
these problems when it passed the Economic Growth, Regulatory
Relief, and Consumer Protection Act to lessen the regulatory
burdens on small banks.11 The Act exempted small and mid-sized
banks from stress testing requirements and other standards,
releasing them from the stranglehold of Dodd-Frank regulation.12
One small bank CEO described the 2018 revision as “kind of like
the Super Bowl” for small banks.13


82254 (search the title of the article and then click on the article) (“By increasing capital
reserve requirements and regulatory costs, many small banks facing a profit crunch have
been forced to close or consolidate.”); Bob House, The Dodd-Frank Act Debate and How It
Affects Small Business Owners, INC. (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.inc.com/ (search the title
of the article and then click on the article).
7 David Cho et al., Lawmakers Guide Dodd-Frank Bill for Wall Street Reform into
Homestretch, WASH. POST (June 26, 2010), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/con
tent/article/2010/06/25/AR2010062500675.html.
8 See Hester Peirce et al., How Are Small Banks Faring Under Dodd-Frank?, 7–8
(Mercatus Ctr. At George Mason Univ., Working Paper No.14-05, Feb. 27, 2014),
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Peirce_SmallBankSurvey_v1.pdf
(noting
that
although the purpose of the law was to rein in large Wall Street firms and prevent future
financial crises, the impact caused by Dodd-Frank is much broader than originally
expected).
9 See generally id. (discussing the burden placed on small banks by increased regulation
and providing survey data to illustrate this point).
10 See id. (“Dodd-Frank has proved burdensome to small banks, and customers are
seeing the effects of the increased regulatory burden through reduced product and service
offerings as small banks rethink their lines of business and consider consolidation
activity.”).
11 See Mark V. Nuccio & Richard Loewy, Rolling Back the Dodd-Frank Reforms, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 13, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.
edu/2018/06/13/rolling-back-the-dodd-frank-reforms/ (“Although heralded in the media as
a dramatic step away from regulatory reforms introduced by Dodd-Frank, the changes
included in the Act will generally have the greatest impact on small banks.”).
12 See id.
13 Ty Higgins, Partial Repeal of “Dodd Frank” Welcomed By Community Banks, OHIO’S
COUNTRY J. (May 25, 2018), https://ocj.com/2018/05/partial-repeal-of-dodd-frank-welcomedby-community-banks/ (noting CEO of Heartland Bank Scott McComb praised the DoddFrank rollback, saying “[t]his result for small banks is kind of like the Super Bowl”).
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Now though, the delayed roll-out of another Dodd-Frank
provision threatens small banks with new regulatory standards.
Ten years after its passing, the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) is finally in the beginning stages of putting section
1071 of the original Dodd-Frank Act into effect.14 Section 1071
aims to improve financial transparency and protect small
businesses by requiring financial institutions to record data about
credit applications from women-owned, minority-owned, and
small businesses.15 The principle goal of section 1071 is to protect
small businesses;16 but if the language of the provision is not
crafted with care and is administered too broadly, small banks—
and small businesses by extension—may suffer the same way they
did under previous Dodd-Frank regulatory requirements.
This note closely examines the excessive regulation of small
banks and businesses under Dodd-Frank, including the latest
requirements proposed for section 1071. Having considered the
disastrous effects of other Dodd-Frank provisions, this note
proposes that section 1071 should employ reporting requirement
exemptions for small banks.
Part I of this note discusses the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act in general, provides insight into the
legislative history of the bill, and also examines the effect of DoddFrank regulations on small banks and small business lending in
the years following its passage. Part II explores section 1071 in
detail and analyzes the policy rationales behind its enactment and
planned implementation. Part III summarizes the current
proposals for the implementation of section 1071 reporting
requirements currently under consideration by the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau. Then Part IV provides a critique of
section 1071, addressing the likely harms the new regulations
would impose on small banks and in turn, small businesses.
Finally, Part V proposes several solutions to reduce compliance


14 See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Releases Outline of Proposals Under
Consideration to Implement Small Business Lending Data Collection Requirements, CONS.
FIN. PROT. BUREAU 1, 3 (Sep. 15, 2020), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb
_1071-sbrefa_outline-of-proposals-under-consideration_2020-09.pdf (describing the recent
proposals promulgated by the CFPB to implement section 1071) [hereinafter Outline of
Proposals].
15 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, §1071, 124 Stat. 1376, 2056-59 (2010).
16 See id.
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costs for small banks to best achieve the goals set out by the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau for section 1071.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2008, an extreme downturn in America’s labor markets and
the national economy plunged the country into a crisis.17 Labeled
“The Great Recession,” the crisis caused unemployment rates and
home foreclosures to reach their highest recorded rates since the
Great Depression.18 Over 230,000 businesses in the U.S. closed
during the first quarter of 2009, and over 450 banks failed between
2007 and 2012.19 Unemployment rates peaked at 10.6% and 60%
of households saw a decline in wealth between 2007 and 2009, with
25% losing over half of their total wealth.20 The Recession had
many causes, such as low mortgage lending standards, subprime
mortgage loans; consumers borrowing an excess of money due to
rising home prices; and the Federal Reserve keeping interest rates
low.21 To make sure that the Great Recession never happened
again, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010.22



17 See Erin Coghlan et al., What Really Caused the Great Recession?, UNIV. OF CAL.
BERKELEY INST. FOR RES. ON LAB. AND EMP. (Sep. 19, 2018), https://irle.berkeley.edu/whatreally-caused-the-great-recession/ (discussing the devastation of the U.S. economy caused
by The Great Recession).
18 See id.
19 See id. (“During the first quarter of 2009—the lowest point of the Recession—over
230,000 U.S. businesses closed. From 2007 to 2012, more than 450 banks failed across the
country.”).
20 See Angus Deaton, The Financial Crisis and the Well-being of Americans, NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF HEALTH, 1 (Feb. 2012), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC3290402/pdf/nihms-326996.pdf.
21 See Thomas E. Lambert, Falling Income and Debt: Comparing Views of a Major
Cause of The Great Recession, 2 WORLD REV. OF POL. ECON. 249, 250 (2011) (listing several
causes of the 2008 financial crisis).
22 See Peirce et al., supra note 8, at 7.
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A. The Dodd-Frank Fix
Dodd-Frank has been called “the most comprehensive set of
reforms to our financial system since the Great Depression.”23 At
over 850 pages of legislative text and nearly 19,000 pages of
regulatory text, Dodd-Frank is a behemoth of a law.24 To alleviate
the effects of the 2008 financial crisis and to prevent any future
reoccurrences, the Act employed three pillars: financial stability,
transparency in financial markets, and consumer protection.25
Many aspects of Dodd-Frank, like stress testing for large banks,26
have been welcome additions and produced positive results.27 But
other aspects of the law were met with worry. Although DoddFrank was intended to save the floundering economy by blocking
harmful practices in the financial markets, there was considerable
concern that the Act would hurt small banks.28
B. Importance of Small Banks and Businesses
Small businesses play an extremely important role in the fabric
of America. On both a national and local level, small businesses
boost economic growth and foster community development.29
There are more than 27.6 million small businesses in the United


23 The Dodd-Frank Act: Reforming Wall Street and Protecting Main Street, U.S. DEP’T

OF THE TREASURY

(January 2017), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/ whitehouse
.gov/files/images/Blog/Wall%20Street%20Reform%20Deck%20—%20January %202017.pdf
[hereinafter Reforming].
24 See Peirce et al., supra note 8 at 7 (explaining that “[t]he legislative text of DoddFrank alone totaled approximately 850 pages. As of mid-November 2013, its new
rulemaking had created nearly 19,000 pages of regulatory text, with approximately sixty
percent of the rules still outstanding”).
25 See Reforming, supra note 23.
26 See Dilara Islam, New Decade, New Financial Crisis?, J. OF C.R. & ECON. DEV. (Apr.
22, 2020), https://www.jcred.org/shortreads/qo7annsqwo0deprft1bk4jux1xodl1 (discussing
annual stress testing requirements imposed by the Dodd-Frank Act).
27 See Michael D. Bordo & John V. Duca, The Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on Small
Business, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES. 28 (April 2018), https://www.dallasfed.org//media/documents/research/papers/2018/wp1806.pdf.
28 See Suzy Khimm, GOP Candidates Say Dodd-Frank Kills Small Banks. The Banks
Beg to Differ, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezraklein/post/gop-candidates-say-dodd-frank-kills-small-banks-the-banks-beg-todiffer/2011/11/10/gIQAhgWJ9M_blog.html (listing several political figures who claimed
that Dodd-Frank “is a killer for the small banks”).
29 See Request for Information Regarding the Small Business Lending Market 82 Fed.
Reg. 22,318 (May 10, 2017).
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States, employing 60 million people.30 It is estimated that the total
amount of debt financing (including loans, lines of credit, and
business credit cards) available to small businesses is about $1.4
trillion.31
It is crucial that small businesses have ample access to credit.
Often, small businesses turn to small banks for their financing
needs.32 Classified by the Federal Reserve System as banks with
assets of $10 billion or less, there are 6,279 small banks in the
United States, making up 98.5% of the total number of banks in
the U.S.33 A recent Federal Reserve survey revealed that 46% of
small businesses that applied for credit did so at a small bank, and
22% of small businesses listed small banks as their “primary
source of credit.”34
Importantly, the survey results reveal that small businesses are
more likely to be approved for credit when they apply at a small
bank, as compared to a larger bank.35 The human element of a
small bank cannot be downplayed when it comes to its relationship
with a small business. Small banks often engage with their
customers in ways that larger banks cannot, allowing them to
forge close relationships and draw repeat customers.36 In addition,
unlike large banks, small banks are better suited to lend to
borrowers without extensive credit histories or those with
irregular income.37 For example, small banks are often able to
consider soft data, like a borrower’s character and ability to
manage their finances, to determine whether to offer a loan.38


30 See Outline of Proposals, supra note 14, at 4.
31 See CONS. FIN. PROT. BUREAU, Key Dimensions of the Small Business Lending

Landscape, 21 (May 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/researchreports/key-dimensions-small-business-lending-landscape/.
32 See id. at 24. For the purposes of Dodd-Frank, a bank is “an institution organized
under the laws of the United States . . . which both accepts demand deposits or deposits
that the depositor may withdraw . . . and is engaged in the business of making commercial
loans.” 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1).
33 See Peirce et al., supra note 8, at 9.
34 See CONS. FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 31, at 24, https://bschool.pepperdine
.edu/about/people/faculty/appliedresearch/research/pcmsurvey/content/pca-q3- 2016.pdf.
35 See id. at 25.
36 See Peirce et al., supra note 8, at 12.
37 See id. (discussing how small banks are able to serve “informationally opaque”
borrowers in a way that large banks cannot, which is advantageous for small businesses).
38 See Tim Critchfield et al., The Future of Banking in America: Community Banks:
Their Recent Past, Current Performance, and Future Prospects, FDIC BANKING REV. 4 (2004),
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2005jan/br16n34full.pdf (explaining how
small banks can take soft data into consideration for their lending practices).
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Conversely, large banks prefer to use hard data like credit history
and other information available from financial statements to make
loan decisions.39 Because small banks can consider soft data, they
can lend (and monitor loans they provide) to small businesses in
ways that large banks cannot.40 Small banks are also regionally
important; in the Deep South, large banks are scarce, and
communities are more likely to turn to small banks for their
financing needs.41
C. The Effect of Dodd-Frank on Small Banks and
Businesses
In general, small banks are disproportionally affected when
banking regulations are implemented.42 Small banks often lack
access to the expertise and staffing that a large bank does, making
it difficult to comply with regulations in a cost-effective way.43 For
example, JPMorgan’s compliance staff of over 5,000 employees is
much better equipped than a small bank compliance staff that may
total five or fewer to handle the activities associated with
regulatory compliance, such as researching and implementing
relevant laws and policies and ensuring that the bank acts in
accordance.44 Additionally, small banks are more likely to pass
these compliance costs on to their customers.45 Small banks often



39 See id. at 4 (“large banks prefer hard data (e.g., credit history, income, debts, and
other data available from financial statements and credit reports) and are less willing to
lend to “informationally difficult credits.”).
40 See id.
41 See CONS. FIN. PROT. BUREAU, Final Report of the Small Business Review Panel on
the CFPB’s Proposals Under Consideration for the Small Business Lending Data Collection
Rulemaking, 4 (Dec. 14, 2020), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_1071sbrefa-report.pdf [hereinafter Final Report].
42 See Peirce et al., supra note 8, at 12.
43 See id.
44 See Dawn Kopecki, Dimon Tells JPMorgan to Brace for More Regulatory Woes,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 17, 2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-09-17/
jpmorgan-s-dimon-says-bank-boosting-compliance-efforts; Peirce et al., supra note 8, at 12.
45 See Todd Zywicki, Striking the Right Balance: Investor and Consumer Protection in
the New Financial Marketplace: The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Savior or
Menace?, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 885 (2013) (analyzing the ways in which the onslaught
of regulation occurring after the 2008 financial crisis has had adverse effects, including
forcing lenders to withdraw products they previously offered).
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raise the prices on the basic products and services they offer
substantially to recoup costs of compliance.46
Small banks felt these negative effects and many more when
Dodd-Frank was enacted in 2010. The Act increased regulatory
compliance requirements for small bank operations and added
certain lending rules, rendering small banks less efficient and
reducing the incentive for these banks to make small business
loans.47 Though the Act was not specific to small business loans
and certainly did not set out to impede small business lending, the
new rules bogged down banks; for example, the Act imposed heavy
documentation, requiring banks to record ratings for every loan
they extended.48 In fact, the percentage of loans extended by small
banks to small businesses fell by nearly 18% after 2010—a result
that can almost certainly be attributed to the change in the
regulatory structure under Dodd-Frank.49 While total small
business loans totaled $711.5 billion in 2011, this number shrunk
to $606.9 billion in small business loans by 2011; conversely, large
business loans increased during this period.50 Dodd-Frank also
had the effect of slowing business formation; studies show that the
Act significantly increased the fixed costs of starting and operating
a business (such as compliance costs and increased costs due to
documentation required by Dodd-Frank), causing the number of
new businesses entering the marketplace to decrease.51
Lending and business formation started to rebound only after
the 2018 Act that reduced Dodd-Frank regulations on small banks
were implemented.52 The 2018 rollbacks were a welcome change


46 See Peirce et al., supra note 8, at 13.
47 See Bordo & Duca, supra note 27.
48 See id. at 1 (providing an example of an instance where Dodd-Frank increased

regulatory compliance requirements for banks which had the effect of disincentivizing
lending, especially for stress-tested banks).
49 See id. at 4 (providing statistical data that links the decline in loans extended by
small banks to small businesses directly to the implementation of Dodd-Frank).
50 See Victoria Williams, Small Business Lending in the United States 2010-2011, U.S.
SMALL BUS. ADMIN. 4 (July 2012), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/sbl_11study%20
FINAL.pdf (providing a table that shows the decline in small business loans from 20082011).
51 See Bordo & Duca, supra note 27, at 19.
52 See id. at 28. “Our study also provides evidence that the early stages of the DFA had
a large negative effect on business entry, in contrast to a smaller and only marginally
significant negative effect in latter stages when small banks were granted some exemptions
from some provisions of the DFA.” Id. at 27.
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for small banks in particular.53 The president of a small bank
highlighted one such beneficial provision: the 2018 Act exempted
small banks from mortgage underwriting standards, which
allowed his bank to increase their lending to customers in need.54
As much as the regulatory rollback aided small banks and
businesses, the heads of some small banks complained that the Act
did not do enough.55 Even a former attorney at the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission recognized the need for less regulation:
“Consumers aren’t protected if the regulations are so onerous that
companies can’t lend or provide the financial services that
consumers need.”56
II. A NEW PROVISION: SECTION 1071
Section 1071 of the Dodd-Frank Act was introduced as an
amendment to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), which
was originally enacted in 1974.57 Before Dodd-Frank was passed,
the ECOA stipulated that lenders were not allowed to collect race
and gender data from customers seeking nonmortgage forms of
lending.58 The Federal Reserve Board assumed that the ban on
data collection would prevent lenders from using the information


53 See Higgins, supra note 13; Ryan Tracy & Christina Rexrode, Why the Dodd-Frank
Rollback Has Some Small Banks Yawning, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 15, 2018, 1:19 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-the-dodd-frank-rollback-has-some-small-banks-yawning
-1523793600 (“[The bill’s] 54 sections exempt banks from rules on mortgage lending,
trading and regulatory exams—moves that supporters say would help small and midsize
lenders by allowing them to spend less time and money thinking about rules from
Washington.”).
54 See Tracy & Rexrode, supra note 53 (noting that the Dodd-Frank amendment allowed
Sidney Smith, president of Port Richmond Savings, and his small bank to do more lending
to consumers who don’t meet federal criteria).
55 Id. (“[S]ome Republicans say it doesn’t go far enough to deregulate the industry,
echoing complaints from some banks.”).
56 Sarah O’Brien, Dodd-Frank Changed Consumer Protections After the Financial
Crisis — Here’s How That’s Shaking Out Today, CNBC (Sep. 11, 2018, 8:15 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/11/dodd-frank—cfpb.html. Former SEC attorney Marc Leaf
worked at the SEC when Dodd-Frank was first enacted. See id.
57 See CONS. FIN. PROT. BUREAU, Small Business Lending Data Collection Rulemaking,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/1071-rule/ (last accessed Nov. 14, 2020); Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2014).
58 See Stephen M. Spivey, A Snake Eating Its Own Tail: The Self-Defeating Nature Of
An Overly Broad Implementation Of Section 1071, 22 N.C. BANKING INST. 107, 110 (March
2018) (citing Richard Cowden, Lawmakers Question Fed Ban on Collecting Race, Gender
Data for Nonmortgage Lending, BNA No. 137 (July 18, 2007)).
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in a discriminatory manner.59 However, others—including
members of Congress and consumer advocates—argued that this
prevention of data collection actually limited the ability of
regulators to monitor lending practices and identify instances of
discrimination.60
The ECOA prohibits lenders from collecting certain data from
loan applicants, such as their race or gender, for nonmortgage
loans.61 In 1999, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) proposed an
amendment to the ECOA that would have allowed lending
institutions to gather data on nonmortgage loan applicants
without restriction.62 The FRB reviewed over 600 public comments
solicited in conjunction with the proposed amendment.63 In 2003,
the FRB decided to forego the amendment and preserved the
prohibition on data collection but revised the regulation to allow
lenders to “self-test” their compliance with the ECOA by collecting
data on gender and race for their use.64 Still, the information
collected by lenders was considered privileged and lenders were
not required to provide this information to regulators in
connection with discrimination investigations.65 Following the
2003 decision, proponents of data collection continued to argue
that the personal information collected by lenders could be used to
highlight discriminatory practices, citing the success of the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 in helping minorities and other
disadvantaged groups to obtain mortgages.66



59 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-698, FAIR LENDING: RACE AND
GENDER DATA ARE LIMITED FOR NONMORTGAGE LENDING, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
REQUESTERS 21 (June 17, 2008), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-08-698.pdf.
60 Id. (“[O]thers argue that the prohibition limits the capacity of researchers and
regulators to identify possible discrimination in nonmortgage lending.”).
61 See id. (noting that an example of a nonmortgage loan is a small business loan).
62 See id. at 2.
63 See id.
64 See id. at 2–3.
65 See id. at 3.
66 See id. (explaining that the HMDA required lenders to collect and publicly disclose
data regarding race, gender, and other characteristics of mortgage loan applicants. The
results of the requirement were that minorities and other groups were more successful in
obtaining mortgages, and lenders were less likely to engage in discriminatory lending).
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A. The Formation and Goals of Section 1071
On July 16, 2007, several members of Congress wrote to the
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) to once
again express the need to review the prohibition under the
ECOA.67 The Congresspeople also asked the Government
Accountability Office to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of
amending the rule—to consider the advantages and disadvantages
to banks and small businesses in requiring banks to obtain and
report personal information in the lending process.68 This
prompted another review of the current ECOA prohibition and
was the catalyst for what would become section 1071 of DoddFrank.69
After many years of challenges to the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act, a revision was finally born in the form of Section 1071. Section
1071 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended the ECOA by removing the
ban against data collection and in a full reversal, required the
collection of small business loan data.70 Congress declared that the
intentions behind section 1071 were to: (1) facilitate enforcement
of fair lending laws, and (2) enable a variety of organizations to
compile and use lending data to identify and expand opportunities
for women-owned, minority-owned, and small businesses to
thrive.71 Under section 1071, financial institutions must inquire
whether a business applying for credit is women-owned, minorityowned, or a small business, and if so, the institution must keep a
record of specific information.72 The information includes:
(1) The number of the application and the date on
which the application was received; (2) the type and
purpose of the loan or credit being applied for; (3)
the amount of the credit applied for, and the amount

67
68
69
70

See Spivey, supra note 58, at 109.
See id.
See id.
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, §1071, 124 Stat. 1376, 2056-59 (2010).
71 See Outline of Proposals, supra note 14, at 8 (describing the recent proposals
promulgated by the CFPB to implement section 1071).
72 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, §1071, 124 Stat. 1376, 2056-59 (2010).
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of the credit approved for such applicant; (4) the
action taken with respect to such application, and
the date of such action; (5) the census tract in which
is located the principal place of business of the
women-owned, minority-owned, or small business
loan applicant; (6) revenue of the business in the
last fiscal year of the women-owned, minorityowned, or small business loan applicant; (7) the
race, sex, and ethnicity of the principal owners of
the business; and (8) any additional data that the
CFPB determines necessary.73
This information collected by lenders is then submitted annually
to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.74 This information
is kept by the CFPB for 3 years following its submission and is
made available to the public upon request.75 In addition, the CFPB
may compile the data it receives for its own use.76
Following Dodd-Frank, section 1071 spent over 7 years in a
holding pattern before any steps were taken to implement it.77 The
delay can be attributed to a lack of motivation by the CFPB to set
the proposals into motion; in fact, a lawsuit was filed against the
CFPB to compel the agency to issue a final rule implementing
section 1071.78 In 2017, the CFPB finally issued a Request for
Information Regarding the Small Business Lending Market as
mandated by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA).79 This request for comment

73
74
75
76
77

See id. (“Any applicant for credit may refuse to provide this information requested.”).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Christopher K. Friedman & Brian R. Epling, Ready or Not, Section 1071 is
Coming: The Upcoming Implement of Dodd-Frank’s Women and Minority-Owned and
Small Business Reporting Requirements, BRADLEY LLP (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.fina
ncialservicesperspectives.com/2020/01/ready-or-not-section-1071-is-coming/; 2019 Unified
Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions Semiannual Regulatory Agenda
86 Fed. Reg. 16,888 (Mar. 31, 2021), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/
2021/03/31/2021-05662/fall-2019-unified-agenda-of-regulatory-and-deregulatory-actions.
78 See California Reinvestment Coalition v. Kraninger et al., 2019 WL 2117659
(N.D.Cal.). The CFPB claimed that it lacked resources to implement section 1071, but this
is inconsistent with Former Acting Director Mulvaney’s statement that the agency has all
the resources it needs and has requested $0 in funding for the implementation. Id.
79 See Outline of Proposals, supra note 14, at 4. SBREFA requires the CFPB “to consult
with representatives of small entities likely to be affected directly by the regulations [they]
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allowed the CFPB to learn more about small business lending data
and the potential complexities involved with a collection and
reporting requirement.80 The CFPB also held symposiums and
released surveys and reports to better inform their decisionmaking.81 On September 15, 2020, over 10 years after the passage
of Dodd-Frank, the CFPB released an “Outline of Proposals Under
Consideration and Alternatives Considered.” 82 This outline
described the proposed procedures to implement section 1071 and
an analysis of potential impacts on entities directly affected by the
section.83
B. Outline of Proposals for Section 1071 Promulgated by
the CFPB
As the most recent step in the rulemaking process, the Outline
is a 75-page report on the plans to implement section 1071.84 The
purpose of this Outline is to solicit feedback on the proposals from
so-called small entities, which include small businesses and
organizations.85 There are standards governing which entities can
participate in this step of the rulemaking process.86 Discussed in
the proposals is the overall scope of the implementation of section
1071, key definitions, and possible exemptions to be considered
under the rule.87



are considering proposing and to obtain feedback on the likely impacts the rules [they] are
considering would have on small entities.” Id.
80 See Request for Information, supra note 29.
81 See CONS. FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 57.
82 See id.
83 See id.
84 See Outline of Proposals, supra note 14, at 3.
85 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, Learn about the Regulatory Flexibility Act,
https://www.epa.gov/reg-flex/learn-about-regulatory-flexibility-act#definitions (last visited
Oct. 16, 2021). SBREFA defines “small entity” as a small business, small organization, or
small governmental jurisdiction.
86 See id. Small business size standards, for example, are usually determined by
number of employers or average annual receipts, depending on the industry. Id. A small
organization is any “not-for-profit enterprise which is independently owned and operated
and is not dominant in its field.” Id.
87 See Outline of Proposals, supra note 14, at 1.
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i. Definitions in Section 1071
There are several definitional issues presented in section 1071.
The current rule uses vague language, leaving many confused
about who the rule covers and what must be done to comply. It is
critical to the mission of section 1071 that the rule be as clear and
concise as possible to ensure that proper data is reported and to
avoid any regulatory conflicts. The CFPB has taken a step in the
right direction by attempting to provide definitions for some key
terms used in section 1071. For example, the Bureau is
considering which one of three options would best define a small
business:
1. Gross annual revenue with a threshold of either
$1 million or $5 million;
2. 500 or fewer employees for manufacturing and
wholesale businesses, and $8 million or less in gross
annual revenue for all other industries; or
3. Either [the] number of employees or gross annual
revenue based on which of the 13 identified industry
groups the small business falls into.88
Additionally, the CFPB is proposing a definition for what
constitutes a “minority individual” when it comes to a minorityowned business.89 The definition would mirror that of the HMDA’s
categories for minorities and would also clarify that a multi-racial
person would be considered a minority individual.90
ii. The Scope of the Proposed Rule
A major issue surrounding section 1071 is its scope. The text
states that “in the case of any application to a financial institution


88 See id. at 16. The 13 industry groups identified by the CFPB include manufacturing,
retail trade, agriculture, and mining, among others.
89 See id. at 18.
90 See id.
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for credit for [a] women-owned, minority-owned, or small business,
the financial institution shall . . . inquire whether the business is
a women-owned, minority-owned, or small business.”91 A close
reading of the language suggests that lenders must collect data
from all small businesses, whether or not they are owned by
women or minorities and that data must be collected from all
women-owned and minority-owned businesses whether or not they
are small businesses.92 However, data shows that the vast
majority of women-owned and minority-owned businesses are
small businesses. For example, 99.9% of all women-owned
businesses and 99.9% of all minority-owned businesses fall within
the definition of a small business, which is defined as having 500
or fewer employees.93 Thus, the CFPB is proposing in its Outline
of Proposals that financial institutions collect information for all
small businesses including ones owned by women or minorities,
but leave out women and minority-owned businesses that are not
defined as small.94
iii. Exemptions in the Proposed Rule
To best reach the goals of section 1071 and make the
implementation as effective as possible, the CFPB is considering
exemptions for certain small depository institutions (banks)
subject to Dodd-Frank.95 The CFPB has identified multiple
options for an exemption provision, including an asset-based
threshold level of either $100 million or $200 million and an
activity-based metric that would take into account the frequency
and dollar amount of loans extended by a lender.96 These


91 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, §1071, 124 Stat. 1376, 2056-59 (2010).
92 See Outline of Proposals, supra note 14, at 10 (emphasis added).
93 See id. at 9 (defining a small business as having 500 or fewer employees).
94 See id.; Alan S. Kaplinsky, CFPB Issues Report of Section 1071 Small Business
Review Panel, JD SUPRA (Dec. 30, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/cfpb-issuesreport-of-section-1071-84907/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2021).
95 See Outline of Proposals, supra note 14, at 11 (noting that “the Bureau is considering
whether either or both a size-based or activity-based test might be appropriate to determine
when an FI must collect and report 1071 data or should be exempt, given section 1071’s
statutory purposes . . . .”).
96 See id. at 44 (“[T]he Bureau explains that it is considering two potential asset-based
exemption threshold levels of $100 million and $200 million of assets for DIs. It is also
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exemptions are likely to mitigate the effects of section 1071 that
would overburden small banks.97

III: SECTION 1071’S IMPLEMENTATION CONCERNS
It is without a doubt that section 1071 is intended to play a
positive role for minority and women-owned businesses. Womenowned and minority-owned businesses play an important role in
our society and represent a larger share of small businesses today
than at any other point in history.98 It is estimated that 1,000 new
businesses a day are started by women.99 The data collection like
the kind mandated by section 1071 will enable stronger
supervision of lending and prevent credit discrimination.100
Conversely, the requirements imposed by data collection can
create huge compliance costs for lenders.101 And section 1071 was
the only Dodd-Frank provision identified by regulators and
industry representatives as “potentially having a direct impact on
small business lending by community banks and credit unions”
due to the increased compliance burden on small banks.102
Further, the CFPB has not released any framework describing
how they will use the information they receive from banks; the
provision imposes a reporting requirement but does not guide how


considering an activity-based metric for determining coverage.”).
97 See Diego Zuluaga, Implementation Concerns of Section 1071 of the Dodd-Frank Act,
CONSUMER FIN. (Nov. 6, 2019), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_
zuluaga-written-statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (stating that data collection
requirements are more burdensome for smaller entities).
98 See ISSUE: Protect Section 1071 of the Dodd-Frank Act to Ensure Better Access to
Credit for Small Businesses, NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL., https://ncrc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/05/03_fair.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2020).
99 See id. Around 627,000 total small businesses are started each year, according to the
latest statistics from 2008. Julija Andjelic, 42 Small Business Statistics: Everything You
Need to Know, SMALLBIZGENIUS (Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.smallbizgenius.net/by-thenumbers/small-business-statistics/#gref.
100 See Zuluaga, supra note 97.
101 See id.
102 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-12-881, COMMUNITY BANKS AND CREDIT
UNIONS: IMPACT OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT DEPENDS LARGELY ON FUTURE RULE MAKINGS
67 (Sept. 2012) (“Industry officials also have noted that the reporting requirements could
lead banks . . . to develop standardized criteria for their small business lending to avoid
being criticized or penalized by regulators for being discriminatory. They added that such
standardization could then result in less lending to small businesses.”).
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the information will be used. There is no guarantee this
information will support the stated goal of section 1071: to identify
and protect the needs of women-owned, minority-owned, and small
businesses.
A. Compliance Costs
According to industry leaders and regulators, reporting
requirements under section 1071 will cause an increase in the
costs associated with small business lending.103 In its Outline of
Proposals, the CFPB highlighted how section 1071 would increase
costs for lenders: these costs will vary depending on the type of
data storage system a lender uses, the degree of system
automation a lender possesses, and the compliance program a
lender employs.104 Generally, small banks do not possess complex
data storage systems or system automation, and they typically do
not have dedicated compliance departments, so they cannot absorb
compliance costs as efficiently as larger institutions can.105
The CFPB also analyzed compliance costs as either one-time
costs or ongoing costs. A one-time cost is one that a bank incurs
only at the outset of its preparation to implement section 1071. 106
Examples of one-time costs are updating computer systems,
testing these systems, developing applications to reflect reporting
requirements, and developing new policies and procedures.107
Though the CFPB does not currently have an estimate as to the
dollar amount of one-time costs to financial institutions, it is
currently surveying to better understand what one-time costs will


103 See id.
104 See Outline of Proposals, supra note 14, at 46 (“[T]he Bureau identified seven key

aspects or dimensions of compliance costs with a data collection and reporting rule: (1) the
reporting system used; (2) the degree of system integration; (3) the degree of system
automation; (4) the tools for geocoding, (5) the tools for performing completeness checks, (6)
the tools for performing edits; and (7) the compliance program.”).
105 See id. at 47.
106 See id. at 49 (“‘One-time’ costs refer to expenses that the FI would incur initially
and only once as it implements changes required to business operations in order to prepare
to comply with the requirements of the new rule.”).
107 See id. (noting that “one-time costs that would be incurred by FIs to develop the
infrastructure to collect and report data required by the regulation implementing section
1071” include “[u]pdating computer systems,” “[t]esting validating systems,” “[d]eveloping
forms/applications,” and “[p]ost-implementation review of compliance policies and
procedures”).
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be due to section 1071 implementation.108 The information
compiled in that survey will better inform the final rulemaking
process.109
An ongoing cost is an expense that is incurred repeatedly due to
reporting requirements under section 1071. Ongoing costs include
internal and external audits; transcribing data; researching and
resolving questions; and annual internal checks.110 To calculate
ongoing costs for each financial institution, the CFPB developed
formulas that correlate to each activity considered to be an ongoing
cost. For example, the formula for transcribing data is a variable
cost that can be calculated by multiplying hourly compensation by
hours per application by the number of applications.111
The CFPB estimates that small bank compliance costs imposed
by section 1071 can range from $2,500 to $29,550 in additional
costs per year or $145 per application on the high end, depending
on the variability of the costs and the complexity of the lenders’
systems.112 These numbers are just for recurring compliance costs;
the initial cost of implementing section 1071 may cause this
number to rise to a level that is insurmountable for small banks
given the narrow profit margin they operate with and the ultracompetitive nature of the banking industry.113 The ultimate effect
of section 1071 may be a reduction in lending to small businesses
to avoid having to comply with the reporting requirements.
Clearly, this runs contrary to the goal of section 1071 which is to


108 See id. at 52 (“The Bureau is conducting a survey regarding one-time
implementation costs for section 1071 compliance targeted at FIs who extend small
business credit.”).
109 See id. (“Estimates from survey respondents of the one-time costs of complying with
a 1071 rule will form much of the basis of the Bureau’s estimates for one-time costs in
assessing the impact of a proposed 1071 regulation.”).
110 See id. at 50.
111 See id. at 53.
112 See id. at 57.
113 See Scott A. Burns, The Costs of Dodd-Frank, AM. INST. FOR ECON. RES. (May 12,
2019), https://www.aier.org/article/the-costs-of-dodd-frank/ (noting that banks might have
to cut fixed operating costs to help pay for higher regulatory costs); Alexandra R. Larch,
The Effect of Dodd-Frank on the Profitability of Community Banks: An Econometric Model,
9 INQUIRIES J. 1, 1 (2017), http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1526/the-effect-of-doddfrank-on-the-profitability-of-community-banks-an-econometric-model (demonstrating the
negative impact on bank profitability since Dodd-Frank was enacted and showing a positive
correlation between bank profitability and asset size; the smaller a bank is, the less
profitable it will be).
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identify and support the needs of women and minority-owned
small businesses.114
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: PROVIDE EXEMPTIONS AND CLARIFY
DEFINITIONS TO REDUCE COMPLIANCE COSTS
Forcing small banks to comply with section 1071 would drive up
compliance costs and hinder small banks from serving the small
businesses that section 1071 was designed to protect. To prevent
this from happening, the CFPB should employ certain exemptions
they identified in their Outline of Proposals, namely exempting
small banks with assets under $100 million and amending section
1071 to disallow the CFPB from obtaining any additional data
they deem necessary. In addition, the CFPB could remedy
compliance costs by acting as an external auditor for banks, or by
providing informational material about section 1071 rather than
having banks bear the cost of researching the provision
themselves.
A. Exempting Small Banks, Specifically Those With Under
$100 Million in Total Assets
The definition of a “small bank” has been a source of
considerable debate within the financial community.
The
standard measure of the size of a bank is by assets, but the asset
threshold to be considered a small bank varies wildly. While the
FDIC has identified small banks as institutions with $10 billion in
assets and below,115 the CFPB proposes two exemptions of either
$100 million or $200 million in assets.116 Though these thresholds
are far lower than what the FDIC considers to be a small bank,
they would relieve the banks that would be affected most by


114 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, §1071, 124 Stat. 1376, 2056-59 (2010).
115 See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., Defining the Community Bank, 1 (Dec. 2012),
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/cbi/report/cbsi-1.pdf (noting that a $10 billion
size limit has recently been used to define small banks, which are also known as community
banks due to the banking services they provide to their local communities).
116 See Outline of Proposals, supra note 14, at 44.
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section 1071 requirements while still compelling the bulk of
financial institutions to comply.
The CFPB has previously exempted smaller institutions from
statutory reporting requirements.117 In 2013, the CFPB chose to
exempt small mortgage servicers from requirements imposed by
the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act.118 The CFPB has also
exempted small banks and credit unions from its payday lending
rule.119 Further, a size-based exemption would follow the current
regulatory trend toward tailoring regulations to bank size,
complexity, and role.120 Former Federal Reserve chair Janet
Yellen remarked that the Fed has focused recently on making sure
smaller banks are not unduly burdened by regulations.121
The CFPB should move to implement a size-based exclusion for
banks with $100 million in assets or less. Though a size-based
exclusion could be seen as somewhat arbitrary due to varying
definitions of a small bank, it would also provide an efficient and
easy solution because the only information required is the value of
a bank’s assets.122 A size-based exemption would also avoid the
need for small banks to monitor their small business lending
activity, as would be the case with an activity-based exemption.123
An exemption of this kind would allow the CFPB to achieve its goal
of facilitating the enforcement of fair lending laws on small
business loans while avoiding burdening banks that would
struggle to comply with section 1071.
However, the CFPB should avoid excluding all small banks from
section 1071 compliance; an outright exemption could render


117 See Spivey, supra note 58, at 128.
118 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act

(Regulation X), CFPB-2012-0034, CONS. 12 (Jan. 10, 2014), https://files.consumerfinance
.gov/f/201301_cfpb_final-rule_servicing-respa.pdf (setting forth an exemption for mortgage
servicers that service less than 5,000 mortgages from the new mortgage servicing rule).
119 See Spivey, supra note 58, at 128.
120 See Jeanna Smialek, Yellen Says Fed is Working on Tailoring Regulations to Bank
Size, BLOOMBERG QUINT, https://www.bloombergquint.com/global-economics/yellen-saysfed-is-working-on-tailoring-regulations-to-bank-size (last updated Oct. 5, 2017, 5:38 PM).
121 See id. (detailing Yellen’s comments about the Federal Reserve Bank’s commitment
to regulatory improvements for small banks).
122 See Spivey, supra note 58, at 130 (noting that size-based exemptions are bright-line
rules that are easy to implement as the only information needed is the value of the bank’s
assets).
123 See Final Report, supra note 41, at 11 (explaining why a size-based exemption is
preferable to alternative exemption options).
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section 1071 ineffective.124 Setting the size-based exemption at
$100 million creates a “sweet spot” between compiling adequate
data and excluding only a subset of small banks from regulations.
A $100 million threshold would draw a bright line between small
and large banks in a way that would prevent section 1071 from
being “the last nail in the coffin” for small banks.125 The CFPB has
previously recognized that there are stark differences in the way
a small bank operates versus the way a Wall Street bank
operates.126 There is considerable concern that section 1071
burdens on small banks would push customers to Wall Street
banks, which were considerable contributors to the financial crisis
and were the institutions that Dodd-Frank intended to reform.127
Section 1071 compliance costs may force small banks to reduce or
even cease small business lending activity, which runs contrary to
one of the primary purposes of the section: to facilitate access to
credit for small women and minority-owned businesses.128 With a
size-based exemption, however, small business owners may be
more likely to turn to small banks for financing. Due to the
exclusion of these small banks from section 1071 paperwork and
compliance requirements, small banks would be able to spend
more time serving customers and could be placed at an advantage
over larger banks who must comply with the provision, causing
customers to seek lending from small banks instead of larger ones.
The CFPB has contemplated size-based exemptions of $100
million and $200 million, as well as numerous alternatives.129 An
exclusion of all small banks (those with $10 billion and below in
assets) would exclude nearly half of the loans that section 1071
aims to record.130 Conversely, a size exemption of $100 million


124 See Spivey, supra note 58, at 128 (“The CFPB should not, however, exempt all
community banks, as overbroad exclusions could potentially render Section 1071
ineffective.”).
125 See Final Report, supra note 41, at 132 (explaining that other sections of DoddFrank have caused small banks to give up to comply with regulations and that section 1071
may be the final straw for small banks trying to survive).
126 See id.
127 See id. (“Please do not add additional burden onto small community banks, which
could push our customers to the Wall Street banks – the very banks the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform act intended to reform.”).
128 See id. at 149 (explaining that the costs associated with coming into compliance with
section 1071 may cause smaller FIs to stop small business lending activity, which would be
contrary to the purposes of section 1071).
129 See id. (detailing the size-based exemption under consideration by the CFPB).
130 See Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., A Two-Tiered System of Regulation is Needed to
Preserve the Viability of Community Banks and Reduce the Risks of Megabanks, MICH. ST.
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would exempt about 48% of all banks that extend loans to small
businesses; the remaining 52% of banks are responsible for around
99% of small business loans and would have to report this loan
data under section 1071 to the CFPB.131 This means the CFPB
exemption of banks with assets below $100 million would balance
concerns of overburdening banks with regulations and still being
able to obtain the small business lending data they desire.
B. Amending Section 1071 to Prevent the CFPB from
Gathering Information Arbitrarily
Section 1071 provides that the banks must collect and submit
information about loan applicants, including “any additional data
that the Bureau determines would aid in fulfilling the purposes of
this section.”132 This requirement could prove burdensome for
small banks as the CFPB has free reign to compel banks to collect
and submit any data they see fit. The 2015 HMDA Final Rule
provides a clear example of a discretionary data point requirement
that substantially increased the costs of compliance for lenders.133
The CFPB is now considering a rollback of the 2015 HMDA Rule
to lessen the compliance cost burden on banks134—but the CFPB
should avoid this issue with section 1071 by removing the
additional data point provision altogether.


L. REV. 249, 289 (2015) (stating that small/community banks provide about half of all
lending to small businesses); id. at 370 n.149 (explaining that banks that have less than
$10 billion in assets are small/community banks).
131 See Outline of Proposals, supra note 14, at 12 (“[U]nder the Option A exemption
level, roughly 48 percent of all DIs would be excluded from 1071 collection and reporting
requirements. However, DIs that would not be exempt under Option A originate, and would
report, over 99 percent of small business loans made by DIs . . . .”).
132 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, §1071, 124 Stat. 1376, 2057 (2010).
133 See Final Report, supra note 41, at 97 (discussing how the 2015 HMDA Rule
addition, which the CFPB is now reviewing for reduction, added the collection of
unnecessary discretionary data points and created substantial compliance costs).
134 See id. (“Those discretionary data points are now under review for possible
reduction.”); Eric Skrum, WBA Asks CFPB to Eliminate Discretionary Data Points From
HMDA Data Collection and Reporting, WIS. BANKERS ASS’N (Oct. 21, 2019),
https://www.wisbank.com/articles/2019/10/wba-asks-cfpb-to-eliminate-discretionary-datapoints-from-hmda-data-collection-and-reporting (“WBA asked the Bureau to eliminate all
discretionary data points the Bureau added to HDMA data collection and reporting . . . .”).
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Further, there are privacy considerations attached to the “any
additional data” provision. For various reasons, spanning from a
lack of inclusion to racism in the banking industry, minorities are
distrustful of financial institutions.135 Borrowers may be
prevented from seeking loans in the first place if they feel that
section 1071 reporting requirements are intrusive and request too
much personal information.136
Removing this provision and requiring only the enumerated
data to be reported would result in $4-5 less cost per application
and an estimated reduction of 2 hours spent on internal checks
and edits.137 In addition, removing the arbitrary reporting
requirement could reduce future one-time costs that would be
spent upgrading systems to capture additional data fields.138
Small banks would then be able to spend this time and money on
other tasks to help their businesses and serve clients rather than
spending it complying with unpredictable reporting requirements
imposed by the CFPB.
C. Amending Section 1071 to Allow the CFPB to Conduct
Investigations into Small Banks
While small banks may not have the resources to bear the costs
of section 1071 compliance, the CFPB as an organization has a
much larger budget with which they can support the goals of the
statute. To divert costs away from small banks, the CFPB should
act as an external auditor; the CFPB would then bear the costs of


135 See Final Report, supra note 41, at 136 (“Many minorities do not trust financial
institutions and may [i]nstead go somewhere else for funds to avoid too many questions.”);
Aria Florant et al., The Case for Accelerating Financial Inclusion in Black Communities,
MCKINSEY & CO. (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-and-socialsector/our-insights/the-case-for-accelerating-financial-inclusion-in-black-communities#
(“Indeed, almost one in three unbanked households cite distrust of banks as a reason for
not having a bank account.”).
136 See Final Report, supra note 41, at 134–36 (demonstrating that privacy is a major
concern for borrowers regarding section 1071).
137 See Outline of Proposals, supra note 14, at 59 (“Requiring only the collection and
reporting of the mandatory data points would result in $4 and $5 less in ongoing costs per
application. . . . [R]eporting only the mandatory data points would reduce the total time . . .
from 8 total hours to 6 hours.”).
138 See id. (“Reporting only the statutorily required data points may also reduce onetime costs if institutions must pay a one-time cost to upgrade or integrate their data
systems in order to capture the additional discretionary data fields.”).
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compliance and use its supervisory and enforcement powers to
investigate lenders. Doing so would relieve small banks of internal
audit costs while still allowing the CFPB to access lending
information and identify the development needs of small, minority
and women-owned businesses.
When Congress created the CFPB, it conferred upon the agency
four tools to carry out its mission of protecting America’s
consumers:
rulemaking,
supervision,
enforcement,
and
education.139 The CFPB can commence enforcement actions
against various entities, including the financial institutions
covered under section 1071.140 Under federal commercial law, the
CFPB is authorized to gather facts and conduct investigations
before instituting judicial or administrative adjudicatory
proceedings.141 Additionally, the CFPB can work in cohesion with
other federal and state agencies to investigate and pursue
enforcement actions.142 The CFPB relies on several different
sources of information to decide whether or not to open an
investigation.143 For example, the CFPB may decide to pursue
action against a bank due to a consumer complaint or a submission
to its whistleblower hotline.144
Through its enforcement and investigation powers, the CFPB
can take on the burden of ensuring compliance with section 1071
rather than small banks self-reporting to the CFPB. As mentioned
previously, small banks would struggle to implement the
regulatory changes of section 1071.145 On the other hand, the
CFPB has a budget of nearly $230 million to spend on enforcement


139 See Life Cycle of an Enforcement Action, CONS. FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/life-cycle-of-enforcement-action/
(last
visited Mar. 8, 2021) (“Congress provided the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau with
four important tools to carry out the mission of protecting consumers: rulemaking,
supervision, enforcement, and education.”).
140 See id. (“When a depository institution, company, individual, or other entity subject
to our enforcement authority breaks the law, we may take enforcement action against
them.”).
141 See id. (“We are authorized to conduct investigations before instituting judicial or
administrative adjudicatory proceedings under Federal consumer financial law.
Enforcement uses investigations to gather facts and identify violations of federal consumer
financial law to determine whether public enforcement action is necessary.”).
142 See id.
143 See id.
144 See id.
145 See Outline of Proposals, supra note 14, at 11–12.
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actions.146 The amount of funding the CFPB directs towards
enforcement actions reflects its commitment to ensuring
transparency for consumers,147 which runs closely with section
1071’s purpose of facilitating fair lending. To identify needs and
provide opportunities for small women and minority-owned
businesses, the Bureau should divert funds used in its
enforcement work towards becoming an external auditor for the
small banks they seek lending information from. Doing so would
strike a balance between avoiding burdens for small banks and
allowing the CFPB to obtain information enumerated in section
1071.
Further, the CFPB has the power to impose fines on financial
institutions that violate regulations.148 Section 1071 does not
currently penalize banks found to exhibit discriminatory lending
practices. The CFPB could bolster its efforts to facilitate fair
lending even further by amending section 1071 to require that
fines be imposed on banks that violate the statute. Under DoddFrank, the Bureau is allowed to collect monetary fines and deposit
them into the Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund (CPF).149
These funds can then be disbursed to victims harmed by the
activities for which the fine was imposed.150 Civil penalties won
from discriminatory lenders could hypothetically be dealt out to
the small women and minority-owned businesses that have been
discriminated against. The advantages to this are two-fold;
lenders are deterred from discriminatory practices, and if the


146 See CONS. FIN. PROT. BUREAU, Annual Performance Plan and Report, and Budget
Overview 1, 10 (Feb. 2021), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb
_performance-plan-and-report_fy21.pdf [hereinafter
Annual Performance Plan].
Enforcement and supervision-related activities represent the largest portion of the CFPB
budget at over 39%. Id. at 11.
147 See id. at 11.
148 See Enforcement by the Numbers, CONS. FIN. PROT. BUREAU, (Jan. 2021),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/enforcement-by-the-numbers/
(providing
an infographic exhibiting that the CFPB has ordered over $1.6 billion in civil penalties as
a result of enforcement actions); Lisa Rowan, Will Biden’s CFPB Regain Its Edge in a PostTrump Era?, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/advisor/personal-finance/biden-consumerfinancial-protection-bureau/ (last updated Mar. 29, 2021, 4:28 A.M.) (“The CFPB quickly
became known for its investigations of consumer complaints and hefty fines issued against
lenders and other companies that violated financial regulations.”).
149 See Annual Performance Plan, supra note 146, at 20.
150 See id. (“The Bureau is authorized to use funds deposited in the CPF for payments
to the victims of activities for which civil penalties have been imposed under Federal
consumer financial laws.”).
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lenders do discriminate, those harmed will receive financial
compensation.
D. Providing Government Assistance for Compliance Costs
Part of the reason small banks are at a disadvantage when it
comes to compliance with regulations is that they simply do not
have the personnel to handle the research and implementation of
sweeping regulatory requirements.151 In addition to the solutions
already under consideration by the CFPB, the government can
also play a part in reducing this burden. The Wage and Hour
division of the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) provides a
compliance assistance webpage where its users can find
information on how to comply with federal employment laws.152
The goal is to provide “America’s employers, workers, job seekers
and retirees––with clear and easy-to-access information . . . .”
about applicable laws.153 Providing this kind of information is
known as compliance assistance.154 For example, a user can find a
summary of DOL laws, compliance assistance information by law,
employee rights materials, and even state and local government
compliance assistance.155
Currently, the CFPB offers no compliance assistance to the
banks it regulates when it comes to section 1071. To lessen the
compliance burden on small banks, the CFPB could publish a
webpage or circulate materials that would explain the provisions
of section 1071 to banks that do not employ a robust compliance
team. By publishing a central location where banks could find
information on how to comply with section 1071, time spent by
small bank personnel to research the provision would be slashed.
The main concern with section 1071 implementation for small
banks is that time and money will be diverted away from small


151 See Peirce et al., supra note 8, at 13.
152 See Wage and Hour Division: Compliance Assistance, U.S. DEP’T LABOR,

https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/compliance-assistance (last visited Oct. 12, 2021).
153 Id.
154 See id. (“Such information and guidance is known as ‘compliance assistance.’”).
155 See id.
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business customers to focus on the law;156 some of these concerns
would be abated if the government were to provide some measure
of compliance assistance to these small banks.
CONCLUSION
Now more than ever, small businesses across the country are
facing unprecedented hardship. The economic impact of Covid-19
has been catastrophic for women and minority-owned businesses
in particular.157 Given these adverse circumstances, section 1071
is vital for the protection of these businesses and its
implementation should be a priority. However, the
implementation must be done with small banks as a focal point.
As demonstrated by past applications of regulatory
requirements to small banks, overbearing regulation often raises
the cost of compliance to unmanageable rates and produces
negative results for both small banks and the small businesses
they serve. For section 1071 to prove successful in its mission of
facilitating enforcement of fair lending laws and determining
unmet needs for women-owned and minority-owned small
businesses, exemptions should be imposed for certain categories of
small banks. These exemptions are paramount to preventing
small banks from drowning in overregulation and producing the
best results for small banks and businesses alike.


156 See Peirce et al., supra note 8, at 91–92.
157 See Final Report, supra note 41, at 3.

